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COMMENT
Toward an Efficient Licensing and Rate-Setting
Regime: Reconstructing § 114 (i) of the Copyright Act
Why is Sony/ATV Music Publishing, the world's largest music publisher,'
unhappy about its massive hit single "Happy"?' According to CEO and
Chairman Martin Bandier, the answer comes down to the math behind digital
streaming revenues. In the first three months of 2014, the Internet radio titan
Pandora streamed "Happy" more than forty-three million times,' but this
translated into only $2,700 in publisher and songwriter royalties.4 In contrast,
Pandora paid twenty times that rate- $56,ooo - in sound-recording royalties.'
1. Paul Resnikoff, For Sale: 1/2 of the Largest Music Publisher in the World, DIGITAL MUSIC
NEws (Oct. 8, 201S), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2oi5/lo/o8/for-sale-iz-of-the
-largest-music-publisher-in-the-world [http://perma.cc/9WGS-2X3P]. Music publishers
ensure, among other things, that songwriters and composers receive payment when their
songs are used commercially. Frequently Asked Questions, Music PUBUSHERS AsS'N,
http://www.mpaonline.org.uk/FAQjhttp://perma.cc/DC5G-MSH4].
2. In addition to garnering an Oscar nod and a Grammy win, the song sold over 6.4 million
U.S. copies. Jon Blistein, Pharrell Turning 'Happy' into Children's Book, ROLLING STONE
(Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/pharrell-turning-happy-into
-childrens-book-20150217 [http://perma.cc/GCT4-PSSS]; Ethan Smith, Music Downloads
Plummet in U.S., but Sales of Vinyl Records and Streaming Surge, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/music-downloads-plummet-in-u-s-but-sales-of-vinyl-records
-and-streaming-surge-1420092579 [https://perma.cc/NBD5-UFVJ].
3. Maya Kosoff, Pharrell Made Only $2,700 in Songwriter Royalties from 43 Million Plays of
'Happy' on Pandora, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com
/pharrell-made-only-270o-in-songwriter-royalties-from-43-million-plays-of-happy-on-pan
dora-2014-12 [http://perma.cc/2X8M-FRHE].
4. Ed Christman, Sony/ATV Chairman Blasts Payouts from Internet Radio, BILLBOARD (Dec.
11, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/6405569/sonyatv
-chairman-blasts-payouts-from-internet-radio [http://perma.cc/KPD8-BCY7].
s. Id. Songwriters and publishers own the musical work, which comprises the written lyrics
and melody. 17 U.S.C. 5 io6(1), (3), (4) (2012). Recording artists and labels own the
copyright in the sound recording, or the recorded performance, of the song. Id. 5 106(1),
(3), (6); see infra text accompanying notes 10, 11, 20.
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Happily for the songwriter, Pharrell Williams, he is also the recording
artist on the smash-hit track and is thus entitled to a share of both types of
royalties. Generally, however, songwriters and their publishers receive royalties
under a rate-setting regime distinct from that governing artists and their
recording labels. The resulting headline-grabbing disparity between the two
types of royalties has become a source of major contention within the music
industry.
At the heart of the battle over fee parity is § u14 (i) of the Copyright Act.
This statutory provision prohibits the rate-setting court charged with
determining a reasonable royalty rate for musical works (paid to songwriters
and their publishers) from taking into consideration the much higher sound-
recording royalties (paid to labels and recording artists) set by the Copyright
Royalty Board (CRB). Although it is well understood that publishers favored
§ 114 (i) before they opposed it, the rationale behind that initial support has
been misconstrued. Most notably, when setting the musical work royalty rate
in a closely watched 2014 decision, the designated rate-setting court declared
that publishers pushed for the provision two decades ago because they were
concerned that sound recording performance rates would be set lower than
musical work performance rates-and thus drag musical work performance
rates down.8
This Comment examines historical context to correct the record and to
renew the call for reducing some of the inefficiencies deliberately built into our
disjointed music-licensing and rate-setting regime. Part I explains that
publishers supported § n4(i) twenty years ago for much the same reason they
opposed the creation of sound recording performance rights fifty years ago:
they feared that the newly created sound-recording royalties would cut into
publishers' existing royalty pie. Now that sound recording royalties far surpass
musical-work royalties, the appeal of § 114 (i) has flipped: publishers and
songwriters support modifying or eliminating the statute on the theory that a
court permitted to use sound-recording rates as a benchmark might be
persuaded to raise composition rates. In contrast, music users who pay
6. See Ben Sisario, Sony Threatens To Bypass Licensers in Royalties Battle, N.Y. TIMEs
(July 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/o7/i/business/media/sony-threatens-to-by
pass-licensers-in-royalties-battle.html [http://perma.cc/7R2K-XFML] (discussing conflict
between Sony/ATV and music-licensing agencies and the particular importance of royalties
to songwriters).
7. 17 U.S.C. § u1 4 (i).
8. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), afd sub nom. Pandora
Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2015); see infra Part II.
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licensing fees support retaining 5 114(i) because they fear the rise of musical-
work royalties.
So told, the story of § 114 (i) is significant in two respects. As Part II details,
the provision's simple but overlooked history helpfully illustrates why digital-
streaming services and songwriters and publishers should support eliminating
the provision. Although the industry currently sees § 114 (i) as an obstacle to fee
parity and thus beneficial to the music services interested in keeping musical-
work royalties down, the provision is inherently problematic for music services
in the long run. Part III then draws on the larger significance of § 114 (i)'s
passage and retention. Enacted out of the fear that newly created sound-
recording royalties would cut into existing publisher and songwriter royalties,
§ 114 (i) was a reactionary attempt to avoid a holistic revenue system that would
take into account both types of royalties. Recognizing and rejecting the
shortsighted motivations behind the provision's enactment is an important
step toward a more consolidated and more efficient licensing and rate-setting
regime.
1. THE CREATION OF A DIGITAL PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT FOR
SOUND RECORDINGS
A digital music streaming service -be it Pandora, Apple Music, Spotify, or
Music Choice-must obtain two kinds of copyright licenses for the "public
performance" of any song.' The musical-work copyright, owned by
songwriters and their publishers, covers the song's composition and its
accompanying lyrics.'o The sound-recording copyright, owned by artists and
their record labels, covers the performing artist's recorded rendition of the
composition."
The story of how the second of these public-performance rights was
belatedly born is key to understanding the purpose - and flaws - of § 114 (i) and
why music services should join the publishing world in advocating for its
elimination.
9. See R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major
Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 240-41 (2001). A stream, "like a
television or radio broadcast, is a [public] performance because there is a playing of the song
that is perceived simultaneously with the transmission." A music download is not a public
performance. United States v. ASCAP, 627 F. 3d 64,74 (2d Cir. 2010).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
ni. Id. § 102(a)(7).
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A. Performance Rights for Musical Works and Sound Recordings
Musical compositions became copyrightable in 1831,12 and in 1897,
Congress granted musical composition copyright owners the right to control
the public performance of their copyrighted works." Because of the
tremendous transaction costs that individual copyright owners would incur to
personally enforce their rights, the member-owned performing rights
organization (PRO) has long collected and distributed license fees on behalf of
its members."' The two largest and oldest PROs, the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI),1 5 must offer a blanket license to all music users under the terms of two
separate decades-old consent decrees with the Department of Justice." These
blanket licenses grant licensees the nonexclusive right to perform a PRO's
entire repertory of works in exchange for a flat fee or a portion of the licensees'
revenues` and require a designated rate-setting court to set a reasonable license
fee should the parties fail to timely negotiate a rate. 8
12. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
13. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
14. See Broad. Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979). By
lowering the transaction costs of obtaining the right to perform any of the millions of
copyright works, PROs also seek to increase the public's access to music performances. Id.
15. The third PRO, SESAC (formerly known as the Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers) is small, not subject to a consent decree, and generally does not publicly
disclose its royalty rates. Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and
Regulatory Parity in Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1837, 1846-47, 1847 n.46 (2013).
16. These consent decrees were designed to address the Justice Department's concerns about the
anticompetitive nature of a royalty regime that pools thousands of copyrighted works and
offers blanket licenses. The decrees have been modified since their entry in 1941, but remain
in force today. See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2001); United States v. BMI, No. 64-Civ-3 787 , 1994 WL 901652, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1994)-
17. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1980).
is. See United States v. BMI, 426 F. 3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. ASCAP, 87o F.
Supp. 1211, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For a brief description of compulsory licenses, see infra
note 23 and accompanying text. The blanket license requirements laid out in the consent
decrees are often analogized to those of a compulsory license. See, e.g., How Much for a
Song?: The Antitrust Decrees That Govern the Market for Music: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Sen. Mike Lee, Chairman, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition
Policy & Consumer Rights). But the two types of licenses are distinguishable -for example,
songwriters and publishers who do not join ASCAP or BMI are not bound by the decrees'
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But sound recordings did not receive federal-copyright recognition until
1971- more than a century after musical compositions.19 Even then, the
copyright was limited to reproduction and distribution rights and did not
include an enforceable public-performance right. That changed in 1995, when
Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
(DPRA)2o in response to the emergence of music streaming, which threatened
to displace sales of physical records and leave artists and their labels
uncompensated for the widespread enjoyment of their work.'
The DPRA created a limited digital performance right for sound recordings
by way of a complex licensing scheme.' Under the statute, noninteractive
Internet radio services like Pandora are eligible for compulsory licenses,'
which are administered today by the CR1B using a "willing buyer, willing
seller" standard meant to protect the licensee from above-market royalties.'
ig. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
20. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, to9 Stat.
336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
21. See Bonneville Int'I Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003); H.R. REP. No. 104-274,
at 12-13 (1995).
22. The public-performance right for sound recordings is limited in that it entitles the holder to
royalties only for public performances "by means of a digital audio transmission." 17 U.S.C.
§ io6(6) (2012). Under the DPRA's three-tiered system for sound recording copyright
protection, sound recording copyright owners are entitled to full exclusive rights with
respect to interactive Internet transmissions and compulsory-license fees from certain
noninteractive Internet transmissions, but no sound-recording royalties from
nonsubscription broadcast transmissions (terrestrial radio). Id. § 114(d)(1)-( 3 ); see W.
Jonathan Cardi, Uber-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 92
IOWAL. REV. 835, 850-52 (2007).
23. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,266,
33,266 (May 23, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (describing the creation of a
compulsory license for nonexempt, noninteractive, digital-subscription transmissions as a
limitation on the sound recording performance right). Under a compulsory-licensing
scheme, licensors and prospective licensees can negotiate voluntary agreements on a case-
by-case basis, but licensees can also obtain a license at a statutory rate if negotiations fail.
Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Sound Recording Performance Right at a Crossroads: Will Market Rates
Prevail?, 22 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1, 2-3 (2014). Interactive services, which permit users to
make specific requests for particular transmissions, 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7), must negotiate
rates for sound-recording licenses, while noninteractive digital music services like Pandora
are eligible for a compulsory fee. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2014), affd sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
24. See 17 U.S.C. 5 114 (f)(2)(B) (requiring the establishment of rates "that most clearly
represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a
willing buyer and a willing seller"). The CRB applies a different standard, the 5 8o1(b)(i)
standard, to determine performance royalties for digital cable radio and digital satellite
radio, which results in significantly lower rates for those entities. See id. § 114 (f)(1)(B);
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The CR3 was created only after successive failures to establish a royalty regime
that would not crush small webcasters under the combined weight of sound
recording and composition-licensing fees.25 However, the CRB too has touched
off its share of royalty controversy-a fact that demonstrates the problems
associated with webcasters' multipart and disjointed licensing obligations. For
example, on June 26, 2007, Internet radio went dead as dozens of radio stations
observed a "day of silence" to protest a CRB ruling mandating a major
webcasting royalty rate increase.26
One notable characteristic of the CRB's current rate-setting regime is that
the CRB is permitted to consider the rates paid to publishers and songwriters
when it determines the rates that should be paid to recording labels and
artists. Indeed, the CRB has deliberately set compulsory-license fees for
sound recordings at rates multiple times higher than the prevailing rates
for composition-performance licenses, on the grounds that the markets for
these two types of licenses are materially distinguishable.27 In contrast, thanks
Robert J. Williams, Jr., Public Performance Royalty-Rate Disparity: Should Congress Pamper
Pandora's Pandering?, 48 NEw ENG. L. REv. 371, 381-83 (2014).
25. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 5 405, 112 Stat. 2860, 2896 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Digital Millenium Copyright
Act (DMCA) initially provided that sound recording copyright holders and webcasters were
free to negotiate a compulsory-licensing rate; if negotiations failed, the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) would step in and establish rates using a "willing buyer
and a willing seller" model. Eisenach, supra note 23, at 2-3; see 17 U.S.C. 5 114 (f)(2)(B). But
the per-performance royalty rates set by CARP in 2002 touched off a crisis in the webcasting
world and forced a number of small streaming services to shutter their services. See Brian
Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future ofthe Sound Recording Performance Right,
16 MICH. TELEcoMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 188-89 (2009). Congress responded by passing
the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 1i6 Stat. 2780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), giving SoundExchange and large commercial
webcasters time to negotiate and agree on a royalty rate calculated as a percentage of the
webcasters' revenue. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,511 (Dec. 24, 2002). However, the compromise did not
sufficiently lower sound-recording royalties to prevent less lucrative webcasters from ending
their streams. See Kellen Myers, The RIAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A
Callfor Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 431, 449 (2009) (noting the
decision of many stations to cease their streams after the passage of the Small Webcaster
Settlement Act). Eventually Congress enacted a bill phasing out CARP and authorizing the
creation of a three-judge CRB. Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 1o8-419, 5 8oi, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
26. See Chris Taylor, Web Radio Sites Go Silent in Protest, CNN MONEY (June 26, 2007, 10:09
AM), http://money.cnn.com/20o7/o6/26/magazines/business2/internetradio.biz2 [http://
perma.cc/KH38-GQQJ].
27. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd sub nom.
Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). This was after the CRB initially
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to § n4(i), the rate-setting courts are prohibited from considering sound-
recording royalties when setting musical-work royalties." Although publishers
and songwriters revile that legal prohibition today, as discussed below, half a
century ago they were its primary proponents.
B. The Feared Effects of Sound Recording Performance Rights:
Enter 5 114(i)
In the 1960s, some thirty years before Congress created a limited-
performance right for sound recordings, broadcasters and music publishers
formed an "unlikely alliance": together they successfully opposed the creation
of a general public-performance right in sound recordings, because they feared
the effect on their revenue streams.9 Broadcast stations balked at the idea of
paying performance royalties to record companies and recording artists on top
of the performance royalties they already paid to music publishers and
songwriters."o Meanwhile, the PROs feared the consequences of a limited-
royalty pie -that is, the PROs believed that broadcasters forced to pay royalties
to record companies for sound recordings would have less money to pay
publishers and songwriters for the underlying compositions.3'
This fear of a finite overall "royalty pie" not only formed the basis for the
PROs' opposition to the creation of public-performance rights in sound
made the opposite determination- that sound recording performance rates are properly
set lower than musical-composition rates. See Music Choice, Comment Letter
on Music Licensing Study 33 (May 23, 2014), http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensing
study/comments/Docket20l4_3/Music ChoiceMLS_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/W53S-
EXVL] [hereinafter Music Choice Comment]. Put differently, it is no accident that over half
of Pandora's revenue is used to pay sound-recording fees while about four percent is paid to
PROs. In re Pandora, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1 4 (i).
29. Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts: Balancing the Interests of Sound Recording Copyright
Owners with Those of Broadcasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, &
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. 9 (2004) (statement of David
Carson, General Counsel, Copyright Office of the United States, The Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts]; AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC
LICENSING 1296-97 (3d ed. 2002).
30. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 29, at 1297.
31. Put differently, the PROs feared a world in which the overall royalties from the public
performance of recorded music would remain largely the same, but would be divided not
just between publishers and songwriters but also among record companies and performing
artists. Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts, supra note 29, at 9 (statement of David Carson,
General Counsel, Copyright Office of the United States, The Library of Congress); see also
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 29, at 1297 (describing the reasons for the alliance between
broadcasters and music publishers).
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recordings' but also laid the groundwork for the creation of § 114 (i) decades
later. Indeed, the idea resurfaced in 1995 when bills proposing a limited
performance right for certain digital transmissions of sound recordings were
pending in the House and the Senate." In a House hearing that year, Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services,
explained in no uncertain terms that the inclusion of language that would
eventually become § 114(i) in early versions of sound-recording legislation was
the Senate's attempt to address the concerns of music-composition owners:
"These concerns related to what is sometimes referred to as the 'pie' theory:
users might seek to reduce music performance fees to composers, songwriters
and publishers because a new category of authors would be entitled to claim
royalties from sound recording performance."'
By this time, although ASCAP expressed its "support [for] the concept of a
performance right in sound recordings," it remained concerned that record
companies would benefit from the new rights "on the backs of the songwriters
and music publishers who created and own the underlying songs without
which the sound recordings would not exist at all.""s Specifically, ASCAP
feared that the new sound-recording royalties would be subtracted from
existing composition fees. Along with BMI, 6 ASCAP thus urged the inclusion
of statutory language that would "make it absolutely clear that the new rights
being granted did not in any way derogate from existing performing rights in
32. The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 227 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, lo4th Cong. 33 (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks) ("It also has been argued that there
is a finite limit to the 'public performance royalties' that can be paid by those who publicly
perform musical compositions and sound recordings, and that the benefits currently
enjoyed by the copyright owners of musical compositions will be reduced if their licensees
also must obtain licenses from the copyright owners of sound recordings. Although we do
not accept this 'royalty pie' argument as justification for denying public performance rights
to sound recordings, it does highlight a marketplace issue we believe should be
addressed.").
33. See id. at 35, 40 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate
Librarian for Copyright Services).
34. Id. at 35 n.6 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian
for Copyright Services).
35. Id. at 68, 70 (statement of Hal David, Member of the Board of Directors and Former
President, ASCAP).
36. Id. at 73-74 (statement of Kurt Bestor, Professional Composer and Songwriter and BMI
Affiliate) (expressing support for "the expansion of copyright protection to other creative
persons and copyright owners" but urging, on behalf of BMI and other songwriters, the
inclusion of language assuring that "royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works
for the public performance of their works shall not be diminished in any respect as a result
of the rights granted by section lo6(6)").
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underlying musical compositions, and could not be used as a basis for
diminishing the royalties paid for the performance of underlying musical
works.""
ASCAP and BMI prevailed: the 1995 DPRA amended § 114 of the
Copyright Act to include subsection (i).,8 The provision provides that
sound recording license fees "shall not be taken into account in any
administrative, judicial, or other governmental proceeding to set or adjust the
royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works for the public
performance of their works."" The legislative history of the provision clearly
reflects the concerns associated with the "royalty pie" theory: a congressional
report notes that S 114 (i) was designed to ensure that "license fees for music
performance shall not be reduced by reason of obligations to pay royalties
under this bill." 4o Section 114(i) thus contrives a two-way mirror between
sound-recording and musical-work rates, wherein composition rates can be
considered in setting sound-recording rates but not vice versa.41
II. THE PROBLEM WITH ELIMINATING SOUND-RECORDING FEES
FROM PERCENTAGE-OF-REVENUE RATE-SETTING ANALYSIS
The "royalty-pie" rationale that drove publishers' initial support for
1 n 4 (i) reveals that the provision was designed specifically to ensure sound
royalties would be stacked on top of composition royalties. This design
reflected no regard for the revenue constraints of music users or the highly
interconnected ecology of the music-licensing regime. But as the current debate
over 5 114(i) reveals, even today, the fact that the provision was enacted at the
expense of webcasters like Pandora, and could still work to their detriment in
the long run, is not well understood.
37. Id. at 70 (statement of Hal David, Member of the Board of Directors and Former President,
ASCAP).
38. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 5 3, 109
Stat. 336, 343 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 5 i14 (i) (2012)).
39. 17 U.S.C. 5 14(i).
4o. H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 24 (1995).
41. See supra Section I.A. Arguably, this system is structured in such a way that it permits the
CRB to be somewhat reckless in setting high royalty rates. The CRB might be less inclined
to set its rates high if the composition rate-setting court was understood to have the power
to "respond" by raising composition rates.
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A. The Contemporary Understanding of5 n14(i)
The comments submitted by industry entities in response to the Copyright
Office's recent inquiry into the royalty rate-setting process4 demonstrate that
even industry actors tend to understand the function of § 114 (i) primarily in
terms of the provision's current role in preventing rate-setting courts from
pursuing fee parity. Thus, the publishing world advocates modifying or
eliminating § 1 4(i) to help secure higher musical-work rates.43 Most notably,
this advocacy has included legislative efforts such as the proposed Songwriter
Equity Act of 2014.' Meanwhile, broadcasters and streaming services have
pushed back with arguments for retaining § n14 (i) to keep the musical-work
royalties they pay from rising to the level of sound-recording royalties.4s
Industry actors are not alone in reading § 114 (i) as a prohibition primarily
designed to prevent sound-recording rates from being used as a benchmark for
musical-work rates. In March 2014, the same month that the Copyright Office
launched its music-licensing study,46 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York conducted a closely watched rate-setting proceeding over
42. Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,739,
14,739 (Mar. 17, 2014).
43. ASCAP, Comment Letter on Music Licensing Study 27-30 (May 23, 2014),
http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2014_3/ASCAPMLS201
4.pdf [http://perma.cc/ERSK-58G]; BMI, Comment Letter on Music Licensing Study
9-13 (May 23, 2014), http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2o4
3/BMIMLS-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/LC3Z-4A7B] [hereinafter BMI Comment];
National Music Publishers' Association, Inc. and the Harry Fox Agency, Inc., Comment
Letter on Music Licensing Study 20-22 (May 23, 2014), http://copyright.gov/docs
/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2014-3/NMPAHFAMLS-2014.pdf [http://perma
.cc/M3UR-5V97] [hereinafter NMPA Comment].
44. The proposed Songwriter Equity Act of 2014, introduced to the House of Representatives on
February 25, 2014 and to the Senate on May 12, 2014, calls for, among other things,
amending § 114 (i) to allow rate-setting courts to consider sound recording
public performance royalty rates at heir discretion. See Ed Christman, Songwriter Equity Act
Picks Up Momentum in Senate, Aims To Modernize Copyright Law, BH.BOARD (May 12,
2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/6o84822/songwriter-equiry
-act-senate-copyright-law [http://perma.cc/6R68-A3DH].
45. See also National Association of Broadcasters, Comment Letter on Music Licensing
Study 22-25 (May 23, 2014), http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/comments
/Docket2014_3/NationalAssociation of BroadcastersMLS_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc
/W2T 4-LSGJ] [hereinafter NAB Comment] (objecting to repealing § 114(i));
Netflix, Comment Letter on Music Licensing Study 7-8, http://copyright.gov/docs
/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2o4_/Netflix IncMLS_2014.pdf [http://perma
.cc/XH7W-RE74] [hereinafter Netflix Comment] (objecting to repealing 9 114(i)).
46. Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,739,
14,739 (Mar. 17, 2014).
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musical work license fees.' There, to determine a reasonable royalty rate for
Pandora's use of the works in the ASCAP repertory, Judge Cote properly
excluded sound-recording fees from her analysis on the grounds that § 114(i)
barred the court from considering ASCAP's argument for parity between the
rate for performance of a composition and the rate for sound-recording
rights.4 But in an unsupported footnote, the court summed up the history of §
114(i) as follows: "Publishers lobbied for this provision in Congress because
they were concerned that the sound recording rates would be set below the
public performance rates for compositions and drag down the latter. ASCAP
also supported the enactment of the provision, for the same reason."49
As is apparent from Part I, the court's explanation for why publishers and
ASCAP once supported § 114(i) is only partially correct. Undeniably, the
publishing industry supported 5 n14 (i) because it feared that sound-recording
royalties might otherwise decrease the royalties already being paid to
composition copyright owners.so But this support was largely driven by the
simple concern that the new royalties would cut into existing composition
royalties - the "royalty pie" rationale.s"
This history has not gone entirely unrecognized. For example, in their
comment submissions to the Copyright Office, two PROs pointed out that
§ 114(i) was intended to prevent musical work royalties from being
"cannibalized" by payments to owners of the newly created public-performance
right in sound recordings." But Judge Cote's suggestion that the provision was
enacted out of fear that one rate would be set below and thus drag down the
other suggests that the current fixation on S 114 (i) as a barrier to fee parity has
unduly influenced the contemporary understanding of the provision's intended
purpose. Indeed, a number of industry heavyweights have echoed Judge Cote's
reasoning to explain the change in the publishing world's position on
§ 114(i) - arguing, for example, that "the only reason that the publishers now
47. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd sub nom. Pandora Media,
Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2os).
48. Id. at 366-67.
49. Id. at 333 n-30.
So. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 8.22[A] [3][a]
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2000) ("[The] drafters [of the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995] also wished to 'dispel the fear that license fees for sound
recording performance may adversely affect music performance royalties . (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 24 (1995))).
51. See supra Section I.B.
52. BMI Comment, supra note 43, at ii; SESAC, Inc., Comment Letter on Music Licensing
Study 5 (May 23, 2014), http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/comments
/Docket2o4_3/SESACMLS_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/BPSq-QDGS].
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seek to excise this provision is that sound recording performance royalties have
turned out to be higher than the publishers expected."3
B. The Contemporary Significance of§ n14 (i)
Why does it matter that publishers supported § n4(i) twenty years ago for
reasons other than the supposed gravitational pull between sound-recording
rates and composition rates? First, the court's misunderstanding wrongly
implies that publishers find themselves in a disadvantaged position today with
respect to § 114 (i) simply because they failed to correctly predict the direction
in which the fee disparity would cut. But more significantly, misunderstanding
§ 114(i) as a buffer that prevents sound-recording rates from dragging down or
pulling up composition rates distracts from the inherent illogic of the provision
and the problems that it -and by extension, a severely fractured licensing and
rate-setting regime-have always posed for music users.
The latter point is well illustrated by the comments submitted by Music
Choice in response to the Copyright Office's Notice of Inquiry soliciting public
input on § 114 (i). Unsurprisingly, Music Choice-which bills itself as the
world's first digital-music service- supports retaining § 114(i) because it
equates the provision with preventing the rate-setting court from raising
composition rates.s' Music Choice points out that forcing webcasters to pay
publishers' fees comparable to sound-recording royalties, currently estimated
at forty to fifty-five percent of Music Choice revenue, could make for a
combined licensing burden greater than one hundred percent of webcasters'
revenue.ss What Music Choice does not acknowledge, however, is that
retaining § u4(i) could also bring about this absurd result in the long run. For
§ 114(i) does not merely prevent the courts from using sound-recording rates
to raise composition rates; the provision prevents the courts from using sound-
recording rates for any purpose with respect to setting composition rates. That
could include using sound-recording rates as a reason for capping composition
s3. Netflix Comment, supra note 45, at 8; see also, e.g., Music Choice Comment, supra note 27, at
32-33; NMPA Comment, supra note 43, at 22 ("Originally, songwriters and music publishers
wanted the evidentiary restriction because they thought the 114 rate would be used to
artificially lower the royalty rates obtained by ASCAP and BMI.").
54. Music Choice Comment, supra note 27, at 33-34 (arguing further against the modification of
§ 1 4 (i) on the grounds that the CRB should first be allowed to use the relatively low
composition rates as a benchmark for the purpose of bringing down sound-recording rates).
ss. Id.
1542
125: 15 31 2016
TOWARD AN EFFICIENT LICENSING AND RATE-SETTING REGIME
rates to ensure webcasters are not crushed under the combined licensing
burden.56
In theory, if the court determined that a higher composition rate were
warranted for reasons unrelated to current sound recording royalty rates, it
would have to raise the rate without regard for whether the combined burden
of composition royalties and sound-recording royalties destroyed streaming
services' profitability. Meanwhile, despite streaming services' current support
for retaining § 114(i), nothing in the text of § 114 (i) guarantees perpetual low
musical-work royalties relative to sound-recording royalties, nor does the
provision's modification or repeal automatically threaten to cause an increase in
musical work royalty rates. Even if Congress repealed § 114 (i), a rate-setting
court could well decide to keep composition rates low relative to sound-
recording rates, for the same reasons that the CRB cited in deliberately setting
sound-recording rates far higher than composition rates in 2014.
III. TOWARD AN EFFICIENT LICENSING AND RATE-SETTING REGIME
The significance of § 114(i)'s history extends beyond demonstrating the
undesirability of the provision itself. Deliberately enacted to ensure the
decoupling of royalty rates for musical works and sound recordings, the
provision was by its very design at odds with the creation of a fair and
sustainable overall licensing and rate-setting scheme. Against this backdrop,
publishers' push to enact the provision yesterday, and music services' efforts to
retain it today, together function as an ironic testament to the fundamental
flaws of the fractured system we have inherited and the shortsighted biases that
help perpetuate that system.
Moreover, this history underscores the inefficiencies and suboptimal
outcomes virtually guaranteed by a system under which music users must
obtain multiple rights at rates determined by separate licensing authorities.
And by extension, this history supports the arguments of scholars such as
Jonathan Cardi and Mary LaFrance who have long advocated for a
consolidated licensing and rate-setting system.
First and most obviously, under the present system, users pay multiple
licensing fees for the use of any single song and are subject to a rate-setting
regime that systematically disregards their cumulative-fee burden. If, as the
ASCAP and BMI consent decrees dictate, the court is to set a "reasonable"
56. See NAB Comment, supra note 45, at 25 (arguing against repealing § 114(i) in part because
setting composition rates close to or equal to sound-recording rates would result in total
royalties at or in excess of one hundred percent of webcasters' revenue).
57. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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musical work royalty rate, the court should be permitted to look at a music-
streaming service's entire fee structure. As LaFrance has noted, this would
ensure that the combined burden of sound-recording and musical-work
royalties do not crush streaming services beneath the weight of cumulative and
ever-rising fees or discourage new players from entering the market.5
Second, a more subtle consequence of the currently fractured licensing and
rate-setting regimes may be higher-than-optimal individual royalty rates. As
Cardi observed almost a decade ago, "[T]he separate licensing of
complementary copyrighted works results in an inefficient price for those
works -a price higher than if the works were licensed together as parts of a
derivative whole."59 Copyright owners are positioned to lose, too. Although
their incentive is to increase their royalties, excessive total royalties could also
reduce total sales,"o leading to overall lower profits in the long run.
Third, the burdens associated with a split licensing and rate-setting scheme
have ramifications for the commercial availability of music and for innovative
uses of music. Despite a decade of public demand, the music industry did not
take steps to license online content for electronic distribution until 2001.6' This
supply-demand gap has been attributed to the highly inertial and fractured
state of music licensing and pricing.62 The system also discourages innovative
music users who seek to create derivative works,6 ' as they must secure separate
permissions from both sound recording and musical work copyright owners
for use of a single sound recording.*
Finally, the biggest failing of the current licensing and rate-setting regime
is that it prevents a coherent determination of the appropriate relative
58. See Mary LaFrance, From Whether to How: The Challenge of Implementing a Full Public
Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 2 HARV. J. SPORTs &ENT. L. 221, 244 (2011).
s9. Cardi, supra note 22, at 884.
6o. Id. at 878-79.
61. Id. at 836.
62. Id. at 838.
63. Id.
64. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web ofMusic Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673,
703-05 (2003) (describing the inefficiencies of a system that requires downstream users
seeking to use a sound recording to obtain permission from both the owner of the sound-
recording copyright and the owner of the copyright for the underlying musical work).
Commentators have made similar efficiency arguments to support the consolidated
licensing of reproduction and distribution rights in addition to performance rights, but
these proposals go beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Copyright Office Views on
Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters,
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entitlements of songwriters and publishers vis-A-vis artists and recording
labels.6 s Fees are instead negotiated and renegotiated in piecemeal fashion
through expensive and time-consuming adversarial proceedings that result in
unpredictable attempts at royalty matching and royalty ratcheting.
These myriad inefficiencies could be mitigated in at least two ways. First,
commentators have suggested establishing a single rate-setting authority
empowered to calibrate the two types of royalties, 6  an idea recently endorsed
by the Copyright Office.6 8 This more efficient joint rate-setting regime would
openly recognize sound-recording rates and composition rates as part of an
interconnected licensing universe.6 ' A joint regime could more coherently
determine the appropriate relative entitlements of songwriters and publishers
vis- -vis artists and recording labels than the current separate and reactionary
sound-recording and composition-rate regimes. A joint regime could also set
rates with the assurance that the cumulative licensing burden placed on music
users is equitable, sustainable, and consistent over time.'o
Second, both as an alternative to and in addition to a single rate-setting
scheme, commentators have proposed the consolidation of licenses or licensing
administrators, such that a music user would need to acquire only one license
rather than separate licenses from sound recording and musical composition
copyright holders.' To address the antitrust concerns that arise out of the
6s. See LaFrance, supra note 58, at 246-47.
66. See id. ("The relative entitlements of composers and publishers, on the one hand, and
producers and recording artists on the other, present an important question of copyright
policy, one that should be resolved through the legislative process, with significant input
from all of the interested parties, rather than renegotiated repeatedly in multi-party
adversarial proceedings."); see also Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law
and Streaming Media, ii TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 475-76 (2003) (distinguishing between
royalty rates that reflect marketplace value and those that reflect bureaucratic or political
determinations as to the relative value of sound-recording and musical-composition rights).
67. E.g., LaFrance, supra note 58, at 244.
68. Office of Gen. Counsel, Copyright and the Music Marketplace, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.
198 (Feb. 2015), http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music
-marketplace.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5J4-XRQC] (proposing a "unified ratesetting process,"
with rate-setting powers vested in the CRB).
69. See LaFrance, supra note 58, at 246 (noting that the Copyright Board of Canada has used
joint rate-setting proceedings to set rates for both underlying musical works and sound
recordings to protect users from astronomical cumulative royalties, and observing that a
similarly efficient system would be possible in the United States only if S 114 (i) were
repealed).
70. Id. at 244.
71. Cardi, supra note 22, at 887 (proposing the creation of "a central set of licensing entities,
lber-middlemen from which a potential licensee may obtain all necessary permission to use
musical compositions and sound recordings"); Joshua Keesan, Let It Be? The Challenges of
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overconsolidation of licensing rights, Congress could provide for a single
licensing scheme that permits free negotiations between composition and
sound recording copyright owners as to the appropriate division of royalties,
with conventional provisions in place for arbitration or litigation where
negotiations fail.' In its recently issued study, the Copyright Office favorably
cited a proposal put forth by the Recording Industry Association of America as
a promising example of license bundling, wherein copyright holders could
agree upfront on a public performance royalty split and then together
participate in rate-setting proceedings against the licensee.'
Both of these avenues - vesting rate-setting power in a single authority and
consolidating public-performance rights into a single license-offer clear
advantages over the fractured licensing and rate-setting model, and they would
go a long way toward mitigating the inefficiencies specified above. Joint rate-
setting and joint-licensing regimes would provide for a way to account for the
licensee's cumulative-royalty burden, allay concerns about inflated overall
musical work or sound-recording royalties, reduce uncertainty and complexity
for potential licensees seeking to use licensed works, and express the relative
entitlements of songwriters and publishers versus recording artists and labels.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that efforts to create a copyright regime with
long-term viability should account for the fact that 5 114 (i) was designed to
force rate-setting courts to set composition fees without regard for music users'
total licensing burden. This context and analysis are significant because they
not only help explain why industry actors should unite in seeking the
Using Old Definitions for Online Music Practices, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 353, 368 (2oo8)
(arguing for designation of a single agency to collect all digital-music royalties); Office of
Gen. Counsel, supra note 68, at 198-99 (suggesting that musical work and sound recording
public performance rights be subject to a single licensing and rate-setting regime, and
pointing to a proposal put forth by the Recording Industry Association of America as an
example of how such a system could work in practice).
72. Cardi, supra note 22, at 888-89; see also Casey Rae-Hunter, Better Mousetraps: Licensing,
Access, and Innovation in the New Music Marketplace, 7 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 35, 52 (2012)
(suggesting the viability of various proposals for collective-licensing arrangements that
could balance efficiency interests and antitrust concerns). Congress could also determine
relative entitlements. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 68, at 199. The Copyright Office endorses not only the
consolidation of public performance rights licensing but also the bundling of mechanical
and performance rights. Id. at 5, 16o-6i. Although this Comment focuses narrowly on
public-performance rights, it aligns with this larger movement toward streamlining the
copyright regime and maximizing licensing efficiencies.
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provision's elimination but also underscore the inherent inefficiencies of the
present licensing and rate-setting system and point the way to change.
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Jason Parkin, BA, J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Clinical Associate Professor ofLaw
Nicholas R. Parrillo, J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw
Jean Koh Peters, A.B., J.D., Sol Goldman Clinical Professor ofLaw
Robert C. Post, J.D., Ph.D., Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor ofLaw
J.L. Pottenger, Jr., A.B., J.D., Nathan Baker Clinical ProfessorofLaw
Claire Priest, J.D., Ph.D., SimeonE. Baldwin Professor ofLaw
George L. Priest, B.A., J.D., Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauflman Distinguished Research
Scholarin Law, Economics, and Entrepreneurship
AshaRangappa,A.B., J.D.,AssociateDean
William Michael Reisman, LL.M., J.S.D., Myres S. McDougal Professor ofInternational Law
t Judith Resnik, B.A., J.D., ArthurLiman Professor ofLaw
t Cristina Rodriguez, M.Litt., J.D., Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor ofLaw
John E. Roemer, A.B., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
t Roberta Romano, M.A., J.D., Sterling Professor ofLaw
Carol M. Rose, J.D., Ph.D., Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor Emeritus of Law and Organization and Professorial Lecturer
in Law (fall term)
Susan Rose-Ackerman, B.A., Ph.D., Henry R. Luce Professor offurisprudence (Law School and Department of Political
Science)
Jed Rubenfeld, A.B., J.D., Robert R. Slaughter Professor ofLaw
David E. Schizer, M.A., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
David N. Schleicher, M.Sc., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Peter H. Schuck, M.A., J.D., LL.M., Simeon E. BaldwinProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Vicki Schultz, B.A., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofLaw and Social Sciences
t Alan Schwartz, B.S., LL.B., SterlingProfessorofLaw
Ian Shapiro, J.D., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
t Scott J. Shapiro, J.D., Ph.D., Charles F. Southmayd Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Robert J. Shiller, B.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fallterm)
Reva Siegel, M.Phil., J.D., Nicholas deB. Katzenbach ProfessorofLaw
JamesJ. Silk, M.A.,J.D., Clinical ProfessorofLaw
John G. Simon, LL.B., LL.D.,AugustusE. Lines ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Lawrence M. Solan, Ph.D., J.D., Sidley Austin-Robert D. McLean Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Edward Stein, Ph.D., J.D., Maurice R. Greenberg Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
t Kate Stith, M.P.P., J.D., Lafayette S. FosterProfessor fLaw
Alec Stone Sweet, M.A., Ph.D., LeitnerProfessor fInternational Law, Politics, and International Studies (fall term)
Mike K. Thompson, M.B.A., J.D.,Associate Dean
Tom R. Tyler, M.A., Ph.D., Macklin Fleming Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPsychology
Patrick Weil, M. B.A., Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw and Oscar M Ruebhausen Distinguish Senior Fellow (fal Sern)
James Q.Whitman, J.D., Ph.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofComparative and Foreign Law
* Michael J. Wishnie, BA., J.D., Deputy Dean for Experiential Education, William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, and
Director, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization
t John Fabian Witt, J.D., Ph.D., Allen H. Duffy Class of196o Professor ofLaw
Stephen Wizner, A.B., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw and ProfessorialLecturerin Law
* GideonYaffe, A.B., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Taisu Zhang, J.D., Ph.D., Irving S. Ribicoff Visiting Associate Professor ofLaw (fall term)
Howard V. Zonana, B.A., M.D., Professor ofPsychiatry and Clinical Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
* On leave ofabsence, 2015-2o6.
t On leave of absence, fall term, 2015.
* On leave of absence, spring term,2016.
LECTURERS IN LAW
Sarah Baumgartel, A.B., J.D.
Emily Bazelon, BA., J.D.
Brian Logan Beirne, B.S., J.D.
Tessa Bialek, B.A., J.D.
Jeremy L. Daum, B.S., J.D.
Gregg Gonsalves, B.S.
Linda Greenhouse, BA., M.S.L., Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law
Su Lin Han, M.A., J.D.
Stephen Latham, J.D., Ph.D.
James Ponet, MA., D.D.
Megan Quattlebaum, B.A, J.D.
Michael Ulrich, J.D., M.P.H.
Graham Webster, B.S., A.M.
Robert D. Williams, B.A., J.D.
VISITING LECTURERS IN LAW
Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez, Lic. en Derecho (J.D.)
Catherine Ashton, B.Sc.
Yas Banifateni, Ph.D., LL.M.
Mark Barnes, J.D., LL.M.
Stephen B. Bright, BA., J.D., Harvey Karp Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lincoln Caplan, BA., J.D., Truman Capore Visiting Lecturer in Law
Timothy Collins, BA., M.BA.
Victoria A. Cundiff, B.A., J.D.
Brian T. Daly, MA., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, BA, LL.B., Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law
Gregory Fleming, BA., J.D.
Lawrence J. Fox, B.A., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lee Gelernt, M.Sc., J.D.
Peter T. Grossi, Jr., M.A., J.D.
Menaka Guruswamy, LL.M., D.Phil., Peter and Patricia Gruber Fellow in Globaljustice
David L. Harfst, BA., J.D.
Frank lacobucci, LL.B., LL.M., Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow
Jeffrey A. Meyer, BA, J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, B.A., J.D.
Stephen Preston, BA, J.D., Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow
Richard Ravitch, BA., LL.B.
Eric S. Robinson, M.BA., J.D.
Charles A. Rothfeld, A.B., J.D.
John M. Samuels, J.D., LL.M., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Paul Schwaber, MA, Ph.D.
Michael S. Solender, BA, J.D.
Jacob J. Sullivan, M.Phil., J.D., Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow in National Security
Robert Sussman, BA, LL.D.
Stefan R. Underhill, BA., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Megan A. Wulff, M.P.H., J.D.
David M. Zornow, BA., J.D.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL









































































































































Jacobus van der Ven
Sarah Weiner
Rachel B. Wilf
Ethan C. Wong
Minkeun Woo
Alice Xiang
Youlin Yuan
Chana Zuckier
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR
Wendy Roane
